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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Philip A. Turney appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Turney crashed his vehicle into two stopped police patrol cars, seriously
injuring two police officers. State v. Turney, 147 Idaho 690, 691, 214 P.3d 1169,
1170 (Ct. App. 2009). A jury convicted him of two counts of aggravated DUI and
a persistent violator sentencing enhancement.

kl

The Idaho Court of Appeals

affirmed the judgment over claims that the two convictions for aggravated DUI
violated double jeopardy protections and that the sentence was excessive. Id. at
691-93, 214 P.3d at 1170-72.
Turney thereafter filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging claims
of "prosecutorial error," "ineffective assistance of trial counsel," and "ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel." (R., pp. 4-13.) The petition was verified (R., p.
14), and a copy of an affidavit apparently filed in a different case was also
submitted (R., pp. 16-19).

Turney later filed a "supplement" to the petition in

which he made a further allegation of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (R.,
pp. 42-44.)
The state moved to dismiss the petition.
Turney moved for appointment of counsel.

(R., pp. 49-64.)

(R., pp. 65-66.)

Thereafter

The district court

denied this motion on the basis that Turney had supported none of his claims
with admissible evidence and that the claims were frivolous.
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(R., pp. 68-80.)

Three weeks later

giving Turney

court entered an order conditionally

petition,

days to respond. (R., pp. 90-102.) Turney filed a "bifurcated

response" and an affidavit with exhibits. (R., pp. 123-368.)

thereafter

dismissed the petition. (R., pp. 394-406, 408.) Tumey timely appealed. (R., pp.

410-12.)
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ISSUES
Turney states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Turney's Petition
for Post-conviction Relief because the claims presented
issues of material fact?

2.

Did the district court err by failing to appoint counsel to assist
Mr. Turney in the post-conviction proceedings?

(Appellant's brief, p. 6 (capitalization original).)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Turney failed to show that he asserted any claim for post-conviction
relief that was not frivolous?
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ARGUMENT
Turney's Claims For Post-Conviction Relief Were Properly Found To Be
Frivolous
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that Turney's claims were unsupported by

admissible evidence and frivolous. (R., pp. 68-80.) On appeal, Turney claims he
presented sufficient evidence to justify appointment of counsel in relation to his
claims that the prosecution presented perjured testimony by Officer White
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-12) and ineffective assistance of trial counsel for
allegedly failing to call a material witness, Travis Anderson (id. at pp. 14-18).
Review of Anderson's claims of error show them to be without merit. 1

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel to

represent a post-conviction petitioner pursuant to I.C. § 19-4904 is discretionary.
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Plant v.
State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629, 632 (Ct. App. 2007).

1

The state herein will address only the legal standard applicable to appointment
of counsel because failure to present sufficient evidence to meet that standard
will necessarily mean failure to meet the higher standard of presenting sufficient
evidence to avoid summary dismissal of claims. Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho
168, _ , 254 P.3d 69, 75 (Ct. App. 2011) (failure to present evidence sufficient
to warrant appointment of counsel "compels a conclusion that the application did
not raise a genuine issue of material fact").
4

C.

Counsel Was Properly Denied Because Turney's Claims Are Frivolous
Post-conviction counsel

be appointed if the petitioner qualifies

financially and "alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such that a
reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to
conduct a further investigation into the claim." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651,
655, 152 P.3d 12, 16 (2007); see also Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793,
102 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2004). If the claims are so patently frivolous that there
appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even with
the assistance of counsel, however, the court may deny the motion for counsel
and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing meritless post-conviction
petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007);
Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 493, 95 P.3d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 2004). "Some
claims are so patently frivolous that they could not be developed into viable
claims even with the assistance of counsel." Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168,
_ , 254 P.3d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 2011). Application of this standard to the two
claims that Turney asserts on appeal should not have been dismissed without
appointment of counsel shows no error by the trial court.

1.

Turney's Claim That The Prosecution Presented False Testimony
By Officer White Is Frivolous As A Matter Of Law

In its Order Denying Appointment of Counsel the district court evaluated
Turney's claim that the prosecution had presented perjured testimony as follows:
Essentially Turney appears to argue that there is "newly
discovered evidence" consisting of the fact that subsequent to the
trial, Officer White lost his job with the Boise City Police Department
for "conduct unbecoming of an officer, violations of law and making
5

inconsistent statements during an internal investigation." The relief
he seeks includes a new trial. At trial, Officer White testified that
Turney was the driver of the taxi that hit the police cars.
The subsequent disciplinary action does not establish Officer
White perjured himself at trial. Furthermore, Turney cannot meet
the second requirement of the Drapeau test for a new trial. The
second Drapeau element is that the evidence be material, not
merely impeaching. This is impeachment material only and does
not meet the Drapeau requirements. Therefore, this is not a basis
for post-conviction relief.
(R., pp. 73-74 (citation and footnotes omitted).)

In dismissing the petition the

district court employed the same analysis. (R., pp. 400-01.) On appeal Turney
contends he should have counsel and an opportunity to conduct discovery into
whether there is evidence to impeach Officer White.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 11-

12.) Turney's argument fails because, even if his allegations were entirely true
and supported by the evidence he alleges would exist, this count is not viable as
a matter of law.
In State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976), the Idaho
Supreme Court articulated the four-part test a defendant must satisfy in order to
be entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. That test
requires a defendant to show, as the second element of his claim, that the
evidence offered in support of his motion for a new trial is material, not merely
cumulative or impeaching.

!st at 691,

551 P.2d at 978; see also Grube v. State,

134 Idaho 24, 30, 995 P.2d 794, 800 (2000); State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 597, 605,
930 P.2d 1039, 1047 (Ct. App. 1996). Here Turney admits that he seeks counsel
and further discovery to seek evidence of White's alleged "roguish misconduct" to
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impeach Officer White's testimony.

Because Turney's very goal is to pursue

evidence that will never sustain a viable claim, his claim is frivolous.

2.

Turney's Claim That His Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To
Call Anderson As A Witness Is Frivolous Because There Is
Absolutely No Admissible Evidence To Support It

The district court denied the request for counsel to pursue a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial for failing to call Travis Anderson as a witness,
finding it frivolous, as follows:
Turney further claims in his Supplemental that his counsel
was ineffective by failing to call a witness, Travis Anderson, at trial
or to interview him. Travis Anderson was in Officer White's patrol
car at the time of the incident where he had been placed under
arrest for driving under the influence. However, Turney does not
support his claim with admissible evidence of what Travis Anderson
would have testified, whether he had any admissible evidence and
never filed any affidavits creating a factual issue.
This Court is not required to accept mere conclusory
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or a Petitioner's
conclusions of law.
Therefore, Turney has failed to meet his burden and this
claim does not raise a viable claim.
(R., p. 77 (citations omitted);

R., p. 404.)

Turney claims that trial

counsel's "decision not to corroborate Mr. Turney's version of events and/or to
impeach the credibility of Officer White's testimony was not a strategic choice"
and is therefore "not entitled to deference." (Appellant's brief, p. 16 (footnote
omitted).)

Turney also contends counsel should have been appointed to

"properly assess the validity of claims and to afford the applicant the means in
which to demonstrate prejudice." (Appellant's brief, pp. 17-18.) This argument,
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which apparently assumes deficient performance, misapprehends the applicable
law.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant is
generally required to show that counsel's performance was deficient and that he
or she was prejudiced by that deficiency. LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 118,
937 P.2d 427, 430 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984)).
To establish a deficiency in an attorney's performance, the applicant has
the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.

Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d

1174, 1176 (1988); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67,794 P.2d 654,656 (Ct.
App. 1990). Strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed, but
must be shown to have been based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard v.
State, 126 Idaho 231, 233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (1994). What witnesses to call at
trial is a tactical or strategic decision presumed to be reasonable.

State v.

Chapman, 120 Idaho 466,469, 816 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Ct. App. 1991).
To establish prejudice, the applicant must generally show a reasonable
probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the
trial would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177;
Russell, 118 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656. The deficiency of counsel's
performance must have "so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Ivey
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v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 711 (1992); State v. Beorchia, 135
Idaho 875, 880, 26 P.3d 603, 608 (Ct. App. 2001 ).
Turney presented no admissible evidence whatsoever that suggests
Turney had a potentially viable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Contrary to Turney's argument on appeal, he had the burden of presenting
admissible evidence that his attorney did not call Anderson as a witness because
of an objective shortcoming, such as inadequate preparation. 'The decision of
what witnesses to call is an area where [the court] will not second guess counsel
without evidence of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho
548, 563, 199 P.3d 123, 138 (2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Although
Turney asserts that counsel failed to interview Anderson, such assertion is
merely conclusory and without any admissible evidence because there is no
indication that Turney had any personal knowledge of what efforts his counsel
made to ascertain what Anderson may have been able to testify about. (R., p.
43.)

There is no evidence suggesting that Anderson did not in fact make a

statement, either to the defense or to police. (R., p. 43.) There is no evidence
that Anderson would not have also testified that Turney was in fact the driver of
his own vehicle at the time of the accident. (R., p. 43.) Although Turney alleges
that Anderson's testimony was "potentially favorable" to his defense (R., p. 43),
such is abject speculation.
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Although there is

Anderson was physically present2 there ls no

evidence that he actually saw anything relevant, much less exculpatory, that he
has a memory of events, or that he could provide any testimony at all helpful to
the defense. Tumey's claim that there may have been prejudice is also nothing
more than the abject speculation that Anderson would have testified in this case
differently than the other witness and inconsistently with the physical evidence.
The mere showing that there is a person who may have knowledge about the
case, who was not called to be a witness at trial, is insufficient to show that postconviction counsel must be appointed to investigate whether there might be a
viable claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. It would be ironic indeed to
accept Turney's argument that a complete lack of evidence is exactly what
makes the claim subject to investigation by appointed counsel and therefore nonfrivolous.
The district court denied the motion for appointment of counsel and
ultimately dismissed Turney's claims for post-conviction relief. The district court
concluded that Turney was asserting a claim of newly discovered impeachment
evidence, which by law is not a viable claim. The district court also concluded
that Turney was asserting an entirely conclusory claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel regarding calling Anderson as a witness at trial. The failure to present

2

The district court concluded Anderson "was in Officer White's patrol car at the
time of the incident where he had been placed under arrest for driving under the
influence." (R., p. 404.) This fact was apparently gleaned from the trial
transcript. (R., p. 394.) The state does not contest the district court's factual
determinations based on the transcript, but notes that none of the record from the
underlying criminal case, that the district court took notice
has been included
in the appeHate record in this case.
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has therefore failed to
his petition or denying his motion

error by the district court in either
appointment of counsel.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court order
and judgment summarily dismissing the petition and the order denying the motion
for appointment of counsel.

DATED this 12th day of March, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12th day of March, 2012, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
PHILIP A. TURNEY
IDOC #24289
ICC G-116 A
PO Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83707
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